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SCHOOL FU NDING 
The issue of public funding of religious institutions in education is bound up with the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has struggled through 
a variety of decisions to define what the appropriate level of relationship is between 
public schools and religion. Today, with voucher programs and Faith-Based Initiatives it is 
clear that the problem is still unresolved. 
HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION 
Any discussion of the relationship between public education and religion must begin in 
1791 with the Bill of Rights and the antiestablishment clause of the First Amendment. 
According to the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances:' It is this right of freedom of, and from religion 
that is the corner- stone upon which the entire debate about public support for religious 
education is founded. This is often referred to as the separation of church and state. The two 
components require freedom for religious practice on the one hand, but also freedom 
from the state supporting or establishing religion on the other. 
In practical terms, the issues of religion and the public school are categorized in two 
ways in much of the debate: promotion of religious activities in school, and the use of tax 
dollars to support parochial institutions. A close examination of the record of the Supreme 
Court on these issues demonstrates congruence with the above categories. This chapter 
will focus specifically on state funding for parochial schools. With the decision in the 
Oregon case in 1925 (Pierce v. society of Sisters) the right of parents to choose private 
parochial schools in lieu of public schools was established (www.findlaw.com). From that 
point on, however, it became an open question as to what degree the state might support 
activities in these institutions. 
MILESTONE DECISIONS BY THE SUPREME COURT 
In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (1930), the Court established the child 
benefit doctrine (www.findlaw.com). This doctrine held that private schools could be 
supported by the state provided it benefited only the child, and not the sectarian mission of 
the school. The State could then provide money for lunches, textbooks, and health services. 
This ruling was expanded in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947 to include providing 
buses for transporting parochial students (www.findlaw.com). In this ruling, however, the 
Court also placed some limitations on the scope of the Everson decision. First, the State 
could not be compelled to provide transportation for parochial schools, but could at its 
option elect to do so. Second, nonreligious private schools must be included if religious 
schools were included. 
In 1965, the federal government created a major increase in public financing of 
education with the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
This law was targeted specifically at low-income schools to provide books, materials, and 
services. It was significant, however, in that it was not exclusively applicable to public 
schools, but included private and parochial schools as well. 
Perhaps the most important decision regarding religion and the classroom is Lemon 
v. Kurtzman (1971). In this case the Court instituted a three-part test for the
constitutionality of any law pertaining to public assistance to religious schools. The 
Lemon test asked: (1) Does the law have a secular purpose? (2) Is the primary effect of 
the law to advance religion? (3) Does the law foster excessive government 
entanglement of religion? The purpose of the Lemon test was to define the meaning of 
establishment for the Court. It became the dominant measure of the constitutionality of 
relationships between church and state (www.findlaw.com). 
The result of the Lemon test was a clear differentiation of acceptable public support of 
religious education from unacceptable support. In Tilton v. Richard- son, decided the same 
year as Lemon, the Court held that the state could provide money for the building of 
facilities that had a secular purpose (www.findlaw. com). However, in the Committee for 
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist {1973) the Court struck down a law that 
would have provided money for general facilities upkeep for religious schools on the 
grounds that there was no way to separate what was religious (unacceptable use) and 
what was secular (acceptable use) (www.findlaw.com). Likewise, Nyquist held that 
payments to parents of parochial school children in the form of either tuition payments 
or tax deductions were unconstitutional, as there was no way of limiting the funds to 
strictly secular purposes. Nyquist was struck down because it failed the Lemon test's first 
and second principles the law did not have a secular purpose, and its effect was the 
furtherance of religion, even if unintentional. 
The majority of the Court's decisions since Lemon have adhered to the same standard. 
Those expenditures that are not for strictly secular purposes or cannot be controlled (for 
instance, state funding of field trips), are deemed to violate the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment. However, the principle of Cochran (the Child Benefit Doctrine) still 
holds, and the state can fund things that are secular and benefit the child. 
The Court reaffirmed this position in 1985 in Aguilar v. Felton (www.findlaw. com). 
According to Aguilar, while Title I funds were designated for both private and public 
schools, public school teachers could not be assigned to teach students remedial 
subjects in private schools. Aguilar was seen to violate the third Lemon test of excessive 
entanglement. Schools then proceeded to do such instruction off-campus. However, in 
1997, the Supreme Court reversed its decision on Aguilar in Agnostini v. Felton. The Court 
now held that public teachers could teach such classes in private schools provided there 
was "pervasive monitoring" and  "administrative  cooperation" (www.findlaw.com). 
The basis of the Court's reversal in Agnostini was found in its ruling on disabled 
students in parochial schools. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the Court found 
that the district was required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
to provide a deaf student attending a Catholic school with an interpreter. The majority held 
that the presence of the interpreter would not "add to the religious environment" and 
therefore did not constitute either excessive entanglement or promotion of religion 
(www.findlaw.com). 
Additionally, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, the Court 
held that a tuition grant could be given to an individual who wanted to go to a Christian 
college without violating the establishment clause. Using the Lemon test, the Court 
found that because the aid was going to the individual, the state was supporting the 
individual, not the institution. Therefore, even if a religious school ultimately benefited, 
the purpose of the program was secular in intent, did not create an entanglement 
between church and state, and did not support religion. Thus, the program did not 
violate the establishment clause. The combination of Zorbrest and Witters' decisions 
gave the Court license to allow public school teachers to teach in private schools in 
gnostini. 
More recently, the Court has continued in the permissive tradition of Cochran and 
Lemon in Mitchell v. Helms {2000) (www.findlaw.com). The Court here once again 
asserted the ability of the states to provide material for religious schools. However in 
Helms, the latitude of the states was significantly expanded to include computers, and 
other instructional materials. The majority was divided on how broadly its decision was 
applicable, with Rehnquist, Scalia, 1homas, and Kennedy arguing for a very open policy 
of government support, while O'Connor and Breyer were more restrained in their 
concurring opinion (www.findlaw.com). 
VOUCHERS 
In 2002, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of vouchers with a suit that tested 
the constitutionality of a voucher program established in Cleveland, Ohio 
(www.findlaw.com). The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program (CSTP), ratified by 
the Ohio Legislature in 1995, is a voucher program that provides parents a voucher that 
can be used to pay for tuition at private or religious schools. The program is need-based; 
giving those families whose income is below 200 percent of the poverty level 90 percent 
of tuition costs or $2,250 whichever is less). Families above 200 percent of the poverty 
level received 75 percent or $1,875 (whichever is less). These figures have since been 
raised, and are now linked to the Consumer Price Index. Originally the program included 
only K-8th grade students in the Cleveland Municipal School District though only 
students who did not require separate special education), but was expanded in 2003 to 
2004 to include 9th grade and above. Since the Court ruled, the program has been made 
statewide. This established the first large- scale voucher program. 
The program allowed parents to use the vouchers to enroll their children in private 
charter schools. The majority of schools affected by the voucher program were in fact 
religious schools. The law was challenged on the grounds that it provided monetary 
support of religious institutions, thus violating the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment. 
The first opinion was from a three-judge panel from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which had ruled against the Cleveland voucher program. In Simmon-Harris v.Zelman the 
majority ruled "there is no neutral aid when that aid principally flows to religious institutions:' 
However when the Supreme Court reviewed the ruling it took a quite different approach 
(www.findlaw.com). 
It would seem that the controlling decision for such a case such as Zelman would be 
Lemon. However the recent events had made it clear that Lemon might ultimately be 
sidelined. The request of the Bush (Sr.) administration to review the Lemon decision, 
indicated that conservatives felt the Lemon test was too restrictive. Justice Rehnquist had 
also noted that Lemon was not as solid as it once had been, and had been questioned at 
various points by a variety of justices and ignored in some key establishment cases. 
Likewise, when it came to the issue of public funding of parochial schools, the history 
of the Court was much more unpredictable. In Agnostini v. Felton the majority consisted of 
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. This five to four decision 
showed that the Court had changed its thinking on the establishment clause. Justice 
O'Connor's comments in her opinion are very telling, "What has changed since we 
decided Ball and Aguilar is our understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to 
religion has an impermissible effect.” In Agnostini the answer to that question was clearly it 
did not create an "impermissible effect" (www.findlaw.com). 
The issue of vouchers is much akin to both Agnostini and Witter. If vouchers are given 
to the parents and not directly to religious schools, the logic of Witter would prevail. By the 
Court's current understanding of the Lemon test, such aid would not be seen to infringe on 
the establishment clause. The combination of the conservative block on the Court, coupled 
with the moderates of O'Connor and Kennedy, could very well have been expected to find 
vouchers constitutional. 
Clearly the major issue, as court history might indicate, is whether this was another 
attempt at public funding for religious institutions. As the appeals' court quote above 
indicates, that court concluded it was, and therefore found it un- constitutional. The 
Supreme Court, however, took a different view. It ruled that the program was secular in its 
intention; it provided parents of the Cleveland schools an opportunity to choose to send 
their children to a number of schools; public, private, and religious. That Cleveland has a 
large number of religious schools, and therefore a large number of parents who availed 
themselves of the program (82%) sent their children to private religious schools, was 
ultimately immaterial. As Justice Rehnquist said in his opinion, 
To attribute constitutional significance to the 82% figure would lead to the 
absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in 
parts of Ohio where the percentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where 
Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed (www.findlaw.com) 
In her concurring opinion Sandra Day O'Connor addressed the math of this decision 
explicitly. Reiterating that there are in fact a number of options aside from private 
religious schools, Justice O'Connor notes,  
When one considers the option to attend community schools, the percentage of 
students enrolled in religious schools falls to 62.1 percent. If magnet schools are 
included in the mix, this percentage falls to 16.5 percent. (www.findlaw.com) 
Additionally, the fact that only partial scholarships are provided for religious institutions, 
while magnet and charter schools are provided full funding, is more evidence that the 
establishment clause has not been violated because money as an incentive was clearly 
focused on nonreligious options. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the court. The basis of the decision for him was 
not Lemon, but was ultimately based on those precedents where the court had focused on 
individual choice (Muller v.Allen, Witters v. The Washing- ton Dept. Servicesfor the Blind, and 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District ). In each of these cases, Rehnquist argues, the 
right of individual choice trumps the challenge to the establishment clause. As long as 
individuals make the choice where the money is spent, and there are nonreligious 
alternatives, there is no violation of the establishment clause to be found. 
While Justice Rehnquist did not find Lemon relevant in his decision, Justice O'Connor 
did. In her concurring opinion she argues that the court was, in fact, still upholding 
Lemon as modified by subsequent cases. Instead, Justice O'Connor talks about a 
"refinement" of Lemon by reiterating Justice Rehnquist's theme of "choice." 
What the Court clarifies in these cases is that the Establishment Clause also requires 
that state aid flowing to religious organizations through the hands of beneficiaries 
must do so only at the direction of those ben- eficiaries.  (www.findlaw.com) 
It is the beneficiaries who choose where the state money may go, and thus it does not 
create a constitutional violation. 
Since the Courts' decision in Zelman a number of states have started their own local 
voucher programs, though most are small pilot programs. Ohio leads the nation once 
again by establishing the first state-wide voucher program. Nonetheless, the benefits of 
voucher programs in terms of student achievement are still highly debated. The studies 
that have been done have found mixed results, and have been hampered by the small 
sample size of most voucher programs. At this point, the battle over vouchers has shifted 
to the state courts, where they have been ruled unconstitutional in two states (Florida and 
Colorado). Other states, however, may soon join the fray, and congress looks to take up a 
national program sometime soon. There is no doubt that the issue of vouchers will 
continue to be important in the United States debate on education. 
FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES 
The other issue that pertains to the issue of public funding of religious institutions is 
President George W. Bush's program of government suppor t  for faith-based charities 
engaged in social services work.  Starting in 2001, President George W. Bush signed a 
series of Executive Orders that brought into being the Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives Office. These orders also established Faith-Based and Community 
Initiative centers throughout the various departments of the executive branch 
(Justice, Education, HUD, Labor, etc.). The goal of these orders was to break down 
barriers restricting the application of government monies to faith-based organizations 
for com· munity service. Importantly, from the perspective of public education, the 
requirement of the No Child Left Behind legislation that mandated supplemental 
educational services (such as after-school tutoring, summer intensive programs, etc.) 
for failing schools, has now become an available venue for faith-based 
organizations. 
The legal history of this program has been mixed, with lower courts deciding for the 
Bush administration in late 2005, but the Faith-Based Initiative Office was forced to 
suspend another grant program because of the threat of a lawsuit (Cooperman 2005, 
A25). No cases have made it as high as the Supreme Court yet.  
However, the question of the program's constitutionality remains. It is possible the 
court will find the program constitutional in the end. The argument for deciding this was laid 
out by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard (www.findlaw.com). There, 
Rehnquist argued that motivation was not a determinant in deciding establishment. 
Rehnquist, in fact, makes this argument in regards to social services when he says, "We 
surely would not strike down a law providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the 
homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the 
funds would not have been approved. Also, political activism by the religiously motivated is 
part of our heritage:' Provided that bureaucratic structures are in place that insulate the 
proselytizing functions from the social functions, it is possible that this pro- gram would 
pass the Lemon Test. 
However, two additional considerations should be noted. First, the Supreme Court has 
had a history of divining intentions behind a law. In the Louisiana Balanced Treatment 
Act (which allowed teaching creationist alternatives to evolution in the public schools), 
the legislature had discussed at length in hearings the constitutional issues, and 
specifically formulated the law in an attempt to avoid those issues. The Court, 
nevertheless, determined that the true intent was the promotion of a religious belief, not 
the offering of "all the evidence”. While the facts in the case of President Bush's program 
would certainly be different, if the Court thought that the intent of the program was the 
advancement of religious institutions, it may well rule that the program violated the 
establishment  clause. 
Second, exclusive aid of religious institutions was specifically banned in Everson. This 
decision included both the privileging of one group over another, or the help of religion in 
general. Much of the controversy regarding Bush's pro- gram is vis-a-vis different religious 
groups. For instance, will the Nation of Islam be included despite its leader's comments on 
Jews? Will neo-pagan groups, like the Wiccans who many Christians see as a satanic 
threat, be eligible? Any at· tempt to distinguish between prima fade religious groups may 
quickly run afoul of the establishment clause. 
With the change in the makeup of the court from the Rehnquist court to the 
Roberts court, any prediction regarding the constitutionality of Faith-Based Initiatives 
becomes difficult. However, it is worth noting that the GAO's report on Faith-Based 
Initiatives in 2006 shows that governmental departments are not making the necessary 
distinctions that the Court has in the past required (GAO 2006). Appropriate safeguards 
were mandated in the Executive Order 13279 in 2002. However, the GAO's report 
indicated that such safeguards have not been explicitly given to Faith-Based 
Organizations participating in the program and that much confusion remains. It may be 
that ultimately it is this that becomes the grounds upon which the program is 
challenged. 
CONCLUSION 
The battle over the establishment clause continues on in American public dis- course 
and jurisprudence. The handful of words provided by the framers of the Bill of Rights 
has actually produced a host of court cases, as the practical mean- ing of those words is 
defined and redefined by the Supreme Court. The makeup of the Court continues to be 
important in what sort of decisions it ultimately reaches. With new members joining the 
Court it remains to be seen whether the path the Rehnquist Court took will continue. 
With the continued criticisms of public schools that have followed the pas- sage of 
the No Child Left Behind law, the turn to private alternatives may in- crease. The 
decision on vouchers still shows that while the Court has previously been reluctant to 
give carte blanche to public funding of religious schools, it has opened the door to see 
them as an alternative, particularly in districts that are considered failures. What future 
decisions will hold, remain to be seen. 
See also Homeschooling; Separation of Church and State. 
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